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Abstract. Present economic theories make a common-knowledge assump-
tion that implies that the ﬁrst or the second-order beliefs determine all higher-
order beliefs. We analyze the role of such closing assumptions at ﬁnite orders
by instead allowing higher orders to vary arbitrarily. Assuming that the space
of underlying uncertainty is suﬃciently rich, we show that the resulting set
of possible outcomes, under an arbitrary ﬁxed equilibrium, must include all
outcomes that survive iterated elimination of strategies that are never a strict
best reply. For many games, this implies that, unless the game is dominance-
solvable, every equilibrium will be highly sensitive to higher-order beliefs, and
thus economic theories based on such equilibria may be misleading. More-
over, every equilibrium is discontinuous at each type for which two or more
actions survive our elimination process.
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“Game theory ... is deﬁcient to the extent it assumes other fea-
t u r e st ob ec o m m o nk n o w l e d g e ,s u c ha so n ep l a y e r ’ sp r o b a b i l i t y
assessment about another’s preferences or information. I foresee
the progress of game theory as depending on successive reduc-
tions in the base of common knowledge required to conduct use-
ful analyses of practical problems. Only by repeated weakening
of common knowledge assumption will the theory approximate
reality.” Wilson (1987)
1. Introduction
Most economic theories are based on equilibrium analysis of models that are
closed after specifying the ﬁrst and second-order beliefs, i.e., the beliefs about
underlying uncertainty and the beliefs about other players’ beliefs about un-
derlying uncertainty. These models assume that the speciﬁed belief structure is
common knowledge, i.e., conditional on the ﬁrst and the second-order beliefs,
all of the players’ higher-order beliefs are common knowledge. Since these as-
sumptions may easily fail in the in the actual incomplete-information situation
modeled, these theories may be misleading when the impact of higher-order be-
liefs on equilibrium behavior is large. There are examples that suggest that this
impact might indeed be large in some situations (see Rubinstein (1989), Fein-
berg and Skrzypacz (2002), and also Milgrom and Weber (1985)). To overcome
this fundamental deﬁciency, one may want to close the model at higher orders,
specifying more orders of beliefs, and hence weakening the common knowledge
assumption. As Wilson (1987), one might hope that by specifying more and
more orders of beliefs, the theory would “approximate reality.” We demonstrate
that this is not the case. We show that regardless of how many orders of beliefs
are speciﬁed, the closing assumption is required to gain any predictive power
beyond that of iterated elimination of strategies that are never strict best reply.FINITE-ORDER IMPLICATIONS 3
Consider a situation where players have incomplete information about some
payoﬀ-relevant parameter. Each player has a probability distribution about
the parameter, which represents his ﬁrst-order beliefs, a probability distribu-
tion about other players’ ﬁrst-order beliefs, which represents his second-order
beliefs, and so on. Imagine a researcher who has computed an equilibrium of
this game, where a type of a player is an inﬁnite hierarchy of his beliefs,
1 and
would like to make a prediction about the action of a player i according to this
equilibrium. Fix a type ti of player i as his actual type, and write A1
i (ti) for the
set of all actions that are played by some alternative type of i whose ﬁrst-order
beliefs agree with ti. This set is the set of actions that the researcher cannot rule
o u ti fh eo n l yk n o w st h eﬁrst-order beliefs and assumes that the player plays
according to the equilibrium. Similarly, write Ak
i (ti) for the set of actions that
t h er e s e a r c h e rc a n n o tr u l eo u tb yl o o k i n ga tt h eﬁrst k orders of beliefs. Write
A∞
i (ti) for the limit of these (decreasing) sets as k approaches inﬁnity, i.e., the
set of all actions that cannot be ruled out by the researcher by looking at (ar-
bitrarily many) ﬁnite orders of beliefs. This deﬁnition can be put another way.
Consider two researchers who agree on the equilibrium played. One researcher
is certain that player i is of type ti. The other (slightly suspicious) researcher
is willing to agree with this assessment for the ﬁrst k orders of beliefs but does
not have any further assumption. The set Ak
i (ti) is precisely the set of actions
that will not be ruled out by the second researcher.
In a model that is closed at order k, all higher-order beliefs are determined
by the ﬁrst k orders of beliefs and the assumption that is made when the model
is closed. We wish to emphasize the sensitivity of the model’s predictions to the
closing assumption. In a given equilibrium, the model predicts a unique action
for each possible set of beliefs at orders 1 through k, namely the equilibrium
1For technical reasons, we assume that beliefs at each ﬁnite order have countable support.4 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
action for the complete type implied by this set of beliefs and the closing as-
sumption. But in the general model, every other action in Ak
i (ti) is played by
at y p ew h o s eﬁrst k orders of beliefs will be exactly as this type (but will fail
the closing assumption.) Therefore, we cannot rule out any action in Ak
i (ti)
without resorting to the closing assumption.
Our main result gives a lower bound for Ak
i (ti).W ea s s u m et h a tt h es p a c e
of underlying uncertainty is rich enough so that our ﬁxed equilibrium has full
range, i.e., every action is played by some type. For countable-action games,
we show that Ak
i (ti) includes all actions which survive the ﬁrst k iterations of
eliminating all actions which are never a strict best reply under ti.I np a r t i c u -
lar, A∞
i (ti) includes all actions that survive iterated elimination of actions that
cannot be a strict best reply. On the other hand, Ak
i (ti) is a subset of actions
that survive the ﬁrst k iterations of eliminating strictly dominated actions, and
hence A∞
i (ti) is a subset of rationalizable actions. When there are no ties,
these elimination procedures lead to the same outcome, and therefore A∞
i (ti)
is precisely equal to the set of rationalizable outcomes. We extend this charac-
terization to nice games, where the action spaces are one-dimensional compact
intervals and the the utility functions are strictly concave in own action and
continuous–as in many classical economic models.
To illustrate the main argument in the proof of the lower bound, we now
explain why A1
i (ti) includes all actions that survive the ﬁrst round of elimination
process. Let ˜ ti vary over the set of types that agree with ti at ﬁrst order (i.e.,
concerning the underlying parameter) but may have any beliefs at higher orders
(i.e., concerning the other players’ type proﬁle.) Our full range assumption
implies that there are types ˜ ti with any beliefs whatsoever about other players’
equilibrium action proﬁle. Given any action ai of i that is a strict best reply
to his ﬁxed belief about the parameter and some belief about the other players’FINITE-ORDER IMPLICATIONS 5
actions, there is a type ˜ ti who has these beliefs in equilibrium, and therefore must
play the strict best reply, ai, in equilibrium. This argument will be formalized
as part of an inductive proof of the main result.
For general games, Nash equilibrium has weak epistemic foundations (Au-
mann and Brandenburger (1995)) in comparison to iterative admissibility (Bran-
denburger and Keisler (2002)) and rationalizability (Bernheim (1985), Pearce
(1985)). Yet, in application, researchers frequently use equilibrium analysis and
further focus on a particular equilibrium, invoking reﬁnement arguments and
such, so that they can make predictions. Our result shows that the predictive
power–beyond that of our elimination process–obtained in this way comes
from the assumption that is (implicitly) made when the model is closed. That
is, for any such prediction, there are types that are ruled out by the closing
assumption and that behave inconsistently with the prediction in the focused
equilibrium. Therefore, our result suggests that the closing assumption deserves
a close scrutiny, and needs to be justiﬁed at least as much as the explicit as-
sumptions of the model. It would be highly desirable to investigate whether the
types that behave inconsistently with the prediction of the closed model can be
excluded by a weaker set of assumptions.
From an evolutionary point of view, when there are privately observed sig-
nals, if a myopic adjustment process converges, its limit is a Nash equilibrium of
the incomplete-information game with these signals as private information. Our
result suggests then that the limit behavior of such a process may depend on the
elusive signals about the distribution of other players’ signals, higher-order sig-
nals about these signals, and so on. Incidentally, our result has counterparts in
sophisticated and Bayesian learning models: the learning of sophisticated agents
leads to equilibrium if and only if the game is dominance solvable (Milgrom and6 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
Roberts (1991)), and in a speciﬁc model, any sequence of rationalizable action
proﬁles can be a sample path in Bayesian learning (Nyarko (1996)).
Our result also points to a close link between higher-order reasoning and
the equilibrium impact of higher-order uncertainty. When there are no ties,
assuming kth-order mutual knowledge of payoﬀsa n dt h a taﬁxed equilibrium
(with full range) is played is equivalent to assuming kth-order mutual knowledge
of rationality and common knowledge of payoﬀs.2 This implies that when the
equilibrium impact of high-order uncertainty is large, the impact of high-order
failures of rationality is also large. In that case, predictions may be unreliable
without a very accurate knowledge of players’ reasoning capacity.
It is well known that some Nash equilibria may be discontinuous in product
topology and with respect to higher-order uncertainty, as in the electronic-mail
game of Rubinstein (1989). There is an interest in understanding how severe this
discontinuity is. Monderer and Samet (1989,1997) and Kajii and Morris (1998)
have analyzed the weakest topologies that make the equilibrium continuous
over all games (see also Milgrom and Weber (1985) for a continuity result.)
These topologies are quite strong, but since they focus on the worst case games,
such as the electronic-mail game, it is not clear whether the equilibria used
in applications will be highly sensitive to higher-order uncertainty. Our result
implies (and we formally establish) that, if the space of underlying uncertainty
is suﬃciently rich, every equilibrium is discontinuous (with respect to product
topology and higher-order beliefs) for every game at every type for which two
or more actions survive our elimination process.
2The relationship between assumptions about rationality and payoﬀ uncertainty is not
straightforward; A∞
i may diﬀer from both rationalizability and iterative admissibility.FINITE-ORDER IMPLICATIONS 7
As a precedent to our main result, Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) show that
every rationalizable outcome is the outcome of a subjective correlated equilib-
rium (see Section 3 for a discussion.) Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2003) extended
this result to dynamic games and investigated the implications of the restrictions
on ﬁrst-order beliefs and common strong belief in sequential rationality on the
rationalizable outcomes, which coincide with all equilibrium outcomes. It seems
that, using their methodology, one can obtain sharp predictions in sequential
games using relatively mild assumptions. Note that in sequential games, our
lower bound is usually weak, and assumptions about sequential rationality yield
strong predictions (Battigalli and Siniscalchi (2002) and Feinberg (2002)).
Our next section contains the basic deﬁnitions and preliminary results. Sec-
tion 3 is the heart of the paper. There we develop our main notions and prove
our main theorem. Our main theorem is extended to the nice games as a charac-
terization in Section 4, and to mixed strategies and to the spaces of uncertainty
that are not necessarily rich in Section 5. In Section 6, we present our discon-
tinuity results and discuss their methodological implications for global games
and robustness of equilibria. Section 7 contains a very negative result about
Cournot oligopoly as an application. Section 8 concludes. Some of the proofs
are relegated to the appendix.
2. Basic Definitions and Preliminary Results
Notation 1. Given any list Y1,...,Y n of sets, write Y =
Q
i Yi, Y−i =
Q
j6=i Yj,
y−i =( y1,...,y i−1,y i+1,...,y n) ∈ Y−i,a n d(yi,y −i)=( y1,...,y i−1,y i,y i+1,...,y n).
Likewise, for any family of functions fj : Yj → Zj,w ed e ﬁne f−i : Y−i → Z−i
by f−i (y−i)=( fj (yj))j6=i. Given any metric space (Y,d),w ew r i t e∆(Y ) for
the space of probability distributions on Y , suppressing the ﬁxed σ-algebra on8 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
Y which at least contains all open sets and singletons; we use the product
σ-algebra in product spaces. The support of π is denoted by suppπ.
We consider a game with ﬁnite set of players N = {1,2,...,n}.T h es o u r c e
of underlying uncertainty is a payoﬀ-relevant parameter θ ∈ Θ where (Θ,d) is a
compact, complete and separable metric space, with d a metric on set Θ.E a c h
player i has action space Ai and utility function ui : Θ × A → R,w h e r eA =
Q
i Ai. We endow the game with the universal type space of Brandenburger and
Dekel (1993), a variant of an earlier construction by Mertens and Zamir (1985),
with an additional assumption that the players’ beliefs at each ﬁnite order have
countable (or ﬁnite) support.3 Types are deﬁned using the auxiliary sequence
{Xk} of sets deﬁned inductively by X0 = Θ and Xk =
h
ˆ ∆(Xk−1)
in
× Xk−1
for each k>0,w h e r eˆ ∆(Xk−1) is the set of probability distributions on Xk−1
that have countable (or ﬁn i t e )s u p p o r t . W ee n d o we a c hXk with the weak
topology and the σ-algebra generated by this topology. A player i’s ﬁrst order
beliefs (about the underlying uncertainty θ) are represented by a probability
distribution t1
i on X0, second order beliefs (about all players’ ﬁrst order beliefs
and the underlying uncertainty) are represented by a probability distribution t2
i
on X1,e t c .T h e r e f o r e ,atype ti of a player i is a member of
Q∞
k=1 ˆ ∆(Xk−1).S i n c e
ap l a y e r ’ skth-order beliefs contain information about his lower-order beliefs, we
need the usual coherence requirements. We write T =
Q
i∈N Ti for the subset
of
³Q∞
k=1 ˆ ∆(Xk−1)
´n
in which it is common knowledge that the players’ beliefs
are coherent, i.e., the players know their own beliefs and their marginals from
diﬀerent orders agree. We will use the variables ti,˜ ti ∈ Ti as generic types of
any player i and t,˜ t ∈ T as generic type proﬁles. For every ti ∈ Ti,t h e r ee x i s t s
3This assumption is made to avoid technical issues related to measurability (see Remark
1.) Our type space is dense in universal type space, and any countable type space with no
redundant type is embedded in our space.FINITE-ORDER IMPLICATIONS 9
a probability distribution κti on Θ × T−i such that
(2.1) t
k
i = δtk−1
i × margΘ×[∆(Xk−2)]N\{i}κti, (∀k)
and t1
i =m a r g Θκti,w h e r eδtk−1
i is the probability measure that puts probability
1 on the set
©
t
k−1
i
ª
and marg denotes the marginal distribution. Conversely,
given any distribution κti on Θ×T−i,w ec a nd e ﬁne ti ∈ Ti via (2.1), as long as
margΘ×[∆(Xk−2)]N\{i}κti is always countable.
A strategy of a player i is any measurable function si : Ti → Ai.G i v e na n y
type ti and any proﬁle s−i of strategies, we write π(·|ti,s −i) ∈ ∆(Θ × A−i)
for the joint distribution of the underlying uncertainty and the other players’
actions induced by ti and s−i; π(·|ti,σ−i) is similarly deﬁned for correlated
mixed strategy proﬁle σ−i.F o re a c hi ∈ N and for each belief π ∈ ∆(Θ × A−i),
we write BRi (π) for the set of actions ai ∈ Ai that maximize the expected
value of ui (θ,ai,a −i) under the probability distribution π.A s t r a t e g y p r o ﬁle
s∗ =( s∗
1,s ∗
2,...) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium iﬀ at each ti,
s
∗
i (ti) ∈ BRi
¡
π
¡
·|ti,s
∗
−i
¢¢
.
An equilibrium s∗ is said to have full range iﬀ
(FR) s
∗ (T)=A.
The following assumption implies that every equilibrium s∗ has full range.
Assumption 1 (Richness of Θ). Given any i ∈ N,a n yµ ∈ ∆(A−i),a n da n y
ai, there exists a probability distribution ν on Θ with countable support and such
that
BRi (ν × µ)={ai}.
Lemma 1. Under Assumption 1, every equilibrium s∗ has full range.
Proof. T h ep r o o f st h a ta r eo m i t t e di nt h et e x ta r ei nt h ea p p e n d i x . ¤10 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
Elimination Processes. We will use interim notions and allow correlations not
only within players’ strategies but also between their strategies and the under-
lying uncertainty θ. Such correlated rationalizability is introduced by Battigalli
and Siniscalchi (2003) and Dekel, Fudenberg, and Morris (2003). Clearly, al-
lowing such correlation only makes our sets larger. Since our main result is a
lower bound in terms of these sets, this only strengthens our result. Moreover,
our characterization provides yet another justiﬁcation for this correlated ratio-
nalizability. Write Mi for the set of all measurable functions from Θ×Ti to Ai.
Towards deﬁning rationalizability, deﬁne sets Sk
i [ti], i ∈ N, ti ∈ Ti, k =0 ,1,...,
iteratively as follows. Set S0
i [ti]=Ai.F o re a c hk>0,l e tˆ S
k−1
−i ⊂ M−i be the
set of all measurable functions f : Θ×T−i → A−i such that f (θ,t−i) ∈ S
k−1
−i [t−i]
for each t−i. Let also Σ
k−1
−i be the set of all probability distributions on ˆ S
k−1
−i .
Note that Σ
k−1
−i is the set of all possible beliefs of player i on other players’
allowable actions that are not eliminated in the ﬁrst k − 1 rounds. Write
S
k
i [ti]=
[
σ−i∈Σk−1
−i
BRi (π(·|ti,σ−i))
for the set of all all actions ai of i that are best reply against some of his beliefs
in Σ
k−1
−i . The set of all rationalizable actions for player i (with type ti)i s
S
∞
i [ti]=
∞ \
k=0
S
k
i [ti].
Next we deﬁne the set of strategies that survive iterative elimination of strate-
gies that are never strict best reply, denoted by W∞ [ti], similarly. We set
W0
i [ti]=Ai and
W
k
i [ti]=
n
ai|BRi (π(·|ti,σ−i)) = {ai} for some σ−i ∈ ∆
³
ˆ W
k−1
−i
´o
,FINITE-ORDER IMPLICATIONS 11
where ˆ W
k−1
−i ⊂ M−i is the set of all functions f : Θ × T−i → A−i such that
f (θ,t−i) ∈ W
k−1
−i [t−i] for each t−i. Finally, we set
W
∞
i [ti]=
∞ \
k=0
W
k
i [ti].
Notice that we eliminate a strategy if it is not a strict best-response to any
belief on the remaining strategies of the other players. Clearly, this yields a
smaller set than the result of iterative admissibility (i.e., iterative elimination
of weakly dominated strategies).4 In some games, iterative admissibility may
yield strong predictions. For example, in ﬁnite perfect information games it
leads to backwards induction outcomes. Nevertheless, in generic normal-form
games (as deﬁned in Deﬁnition 1 below), all these concepts are equivalent and
u s u a l l yh a v ew e a kp r e d i c t i v ep o w e r .
3. Equilibrium predictions with finite-order beliefs
We are interested in how robust equilibrium is against the failure of assump-
t i o n sm a d ea th i g ho r d e r s ,s u c ha st h ef a i l u r eo ft h ec o m m o nk n o w l e d g ea s -
sumption at high orders. We now formalize our notion of robustness.
Let us ﬁx an equilibrium s∗ and a type ti of a player i. According to equi-
librium, he will play s∗
i (ti). Now imagine a researcher who only knows the ﬁrst
kth-order beliefs of player i and knows that equilibrium s∗ is played. All the re-
searcher can conclude from this information is that i will play one of the actions
in
A
k
i [s
∗,t i] ≡
©
s
∗
i
¡
˜ ti
¢
|˜ t
m
i = t
m
i ∀m ≤ k
ª
.
4In particular, if we use non-reduced normal-form of an extensive-form game, many strate-
gies will be outcome equivalent, in which case our procedure will eliminate all of these strate-
gies. To avoid such over-elimination, we can use reduced-form, by representing all outcome-
equivalent strategies by only one strategy.12 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
Assuming, plausibly, that a researcher can verify only ﬁnitely many orders of a
player’s beliefs, all a researcher can ever know is that player i will play one of
the actions in
A
∞
i [s
∗,t i]=
∞ \
k=0
A
k
i [s
∗,t i].
We are now ready to prove our main result for countable-action games, i.e.,
games where each player i has a countable or ﬁnite action space Ai.
Proposition 1. For any countable-action game, any equilibrium s∗ with full
range, any k ∈ N, i ∈ N,a n da n yti,
W
k
i [ti] ⊆ A
k
i [s
∗,t i] ⊆ S
k
i [ti];
in particular,
W
∞
i [ti] ⊆ A
∞
i [s
∗,t i] ⊆ S
∞
i [ti].
Proof. The inclusion Ak
i [s∗,t i] ⊆ Sk
i [ti] is established by Proposition 8 in the
Appendix for general games and all equilibria. We will now show that Wk
i [ti] ⊆
Ak
i [s∗,t i].F o r k =0 , the statement is given by the full-range assumption.
For any given k and any player i,w r i t ee a c ht−i as t−i =( l,h) where l =
¡
t1
−i,t 2
−i,...,t
k−1
−i
¢
and h =
¡
tk
−i,t
k+1
−i ,...
¢
are the lower and higher-order beliefs,
respectively. Let L = {l|∃h :( l,h) ∈ T−i}. The induction hypothesis is that
W
k−1
−i [l] ≡
[
h0
W
k−1
−i [(l,h
0)] ⊆ A
k−1
−i [s
∗,(l,h)] (∀(l,h) ∈ T−i).
Fix any type ti and any ai ∈ Wk
i [ti]. We will construct a type ˜ ti such that
s∗
i
¡
˜ ti
¢
= ai and the ﬁrst k orders of beliefs are same under ti and ˜ ti, showing that
ai ∈ Ak
i [s∗,t i].N o w ,b y d e ﬁnition, for some σ−i ∈ ∆( ˆ W
k−1
−i ), ai is the unique
best reply for type ti if ti assigns probability distribution σ−i on the other play-
ers’ strategies, i.e., BRi (π(·|ti,σ−i)) = {ai}.L e tP (·|ti,σ −i) be the probabilityFINITE-ORDER IMPLICATIONS 13
distribution on Θ×L×A−i induced by κti and σ−i. By the induction hypoth-
esis, for each (θ,l,a−i) ∈ suppP (·|ti,σ−i), a−i ∈ W
k−1
−i [l] ⊆ A
k−1
−i [s∗,(l,h)] for
some h. Hence, there exists a mapping µ : suppP (·|ti,σ−i) → Θ × T−i,
(3.1) µ :( θ,l,a−i) 7→
³
θ,l,˜ h(a−i,θ,l)
´
,
such that
(3.2) s
∗
−i
³
l,˜ h(a−i,θ,l)
´
= a−i.
We deﬁne ˜ ti by
κ˜ ti ≡ P (·|ti,σ−i) ◦ µ
−1,
the probability distribution induced on Θ × T−i by the mapping µ and the
probability distribution P (·|ti,σ−i).N o t i c et h a t ,s i n c etk
i has countable support
and the action spaces are countable, the set suppP (·|ti,σ−i) is countable, in
which case µ is trivially measurable. Hence κ˜ ti is well-deﬁned. By construction
of µ,t h eﬁrst k orders of beliefs (about (θ,l)) are identical under ti and ˜ ti:
margΘ×Lκ˜ ti = margΘ×LP (·|ti,σ −i) ◦ µ
−1 = margΘ×LP (·|ti,σ−i)=margΘ×Lκti,
where the second inequality is by (3.1) and the last equality is by deﬁnition of
P (·|ti,σ −i). Moreover, using the mapping γ :( θ,l,h) 7→
¡
θ,l,s∗
−i (l,h)
¢
,w ec a n
check that the distribution induced by κ˜ ti and s∗
−i on Θ × L × A−i is
P
¡
·|˜ ti,s
∗
−i
¢
≡ κ˜ ti ◦ γ
−1 = P (·|ti,σ−i) ◦ µ
−1 ◦ γ
−1 = P (·|ti,σ−i),
where the last equality is due to the fact that µ is the inverse of the restriction
of γ to suppκ˜ ti. Therefore,
π
¡
·|˜ ti,s
∗
−i
¢
= margΘ×LP
¡
·|˜ ti,s
∗
−i
¢
= margΘ×LP (·|ti,σ−i)=π(·|ti,σ −i).
That is, the equilibrium beliefs of ˜ ti about Θ × A−i a r ei d e n t i c a lt ot h eb e l i e f s
of ti about Θ × A−i when ti assigns probability distribution σ−i on the other14 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
players’ strategies. Since ai is the only best reply to these beliefs, ˜ ti must play
ai in equilibrium:
(3.3) s
∗
i
¡
˜ ti
¢
∈ BRi
¡
π
¡
·|˜ ti,s
∗
−i
¢¢
= BRi (π(·|ti,σ −i)) = {ai}.
¤
Remark 1. Notice that the countability assumptions about the ﬁnite-order
beliefs and the action spaces are used only to make sure that κ˜ ti is a well-
deﬁned probability distribution, or µ is measurable. In fact, whenever µ is
measurable, our proof is valid. In the next section, we present another class of
games in which µ is measurable; µ may not be measurable in general.
The conclusion that Wk
i [ti] ⊆ Ak
i [s∗,t i] can be spelledout as follows. Suppose
that we know a player’s beliefs up to the kth order and do not have any further
information. Suppose also that he has an action ai that survives k rounds of
iterated elimination of strategies that cannot be a strict best reply–for some
type whose ﬁrst k orders of beliefs are as speciﬁed. Then, we cannot rule out
that ai will be played in equilibrium s∗. Put it diﬀerently, if we have a model
that is closed at order k a n di fa na c t i o ns u r v i v e sk rounds of iterated elimination
of strategies that cannot be a best reply for a type within the model, then we
cannot rule out action ai as an equilibrium action for that type without invoking
the closing assumption. Hence, any prediction that does not follow from the
ﬁrst k steps of this elimination process comes from the closing assumptions,
rather than the assumptions that lead to a speciﬁc equilibrium s∗. This suggests
that, contrary to the current practice in economics, a researcher needs to justify
his closing assumption at least as much as the other assumptions, such as the
rationale for equilibrium selection.FINITE-ORDER IMPLICATIONS 15
The part Ak
i [s∗,t i] ⊆ Sk
i [ti] is proved in the Appendix for general games and
for all equilibria (see Proposition 8). Although the proof for the general case is
somewhat involved, it is straightforward for the complete-information case.
Notation 2. For any ¯ θ ∈ Θ,w r i t etCK
i
¡¯ θ
¢
for the type of a player i who is
c e r t a i nt h a ti ti sc o m m o nk n o w l e d g et h a tθ = ¯ θ.
For the types of the form tCK
i
¡¯ θ
¢
,t h ep r o o fi sa sf o l l o w s . N o t i c et h a t
Ak
i
£
s∗,t CK
i
¡¯ θ
¢¤
⊆ Sk
i
£
tCK
i
¡¯ θ
¢¤
means that, if a player i has kth-order knowl-
edge of θ = ¯ θ, then his equilibrium action (according to s∗) will survive kth
round of iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies under the restric-
tion that Θ =
©¯ θ
ª
. Towards an induction, assume that A
k−1
j
£
s∗,t CK
j
¡¯ θ
¢¤
⊆
Sk
j
£
tCK
j
¡¯ θ
¢¤
for each j.T h a t i s , i f a p l a y e r j has k − 1st-order knowledge of
θ = ¯ θ, j will play an action in S
k−1
j (under Θ =
©¯ θ
ª
.) But any type of player
i who has kth-order knowledge of θ = ¯ θ is certain that every other player j
has k − 1st-order knowledge of θ = ¯ θ. Hence, in equilibrium, he is certain that
j p l a y sa na c t i o ni nS
k−1
j . Since his equilibrium action is a best response to
such a belief (with support contained in S
k−1
−i ), it must survive the kth round
of elimination.
Brandenburger and Dekel (1987) show that, given any rationalizable outcome
of a game, by adding payoﬀ irrelevant types, we can construct a type space
with an equilibrium that yields the original rationalizable outcome.5 Since we
need to choose a diﬀerent equilibrium for each rationalizable outcome, there
is a large multiplicity of equilibria, and thus equilibrium as a solution concept
does not have more predictive power than rationalizability has. One may want
to ignore this multiplicity by focusing on a particular equilibrium or relying
on one of the many reﬁnements developed in the last few decades–in order
5See Bergemann and Morris (2003) for an important application of this adea.16 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
to cope with the usual multiplicity problem. Our result shows that, once we
abandon artiﬁcial restrictions on type space, this unpredictability reappears as
high variability of any ﬁxed equilibrium with respect to very high-order beliefs,
albeit with somewhat smaller scope due to the stronger elimination process.
There is an intuitive relation between these two results. Since type spaces in
general can be embedded in the universal type space, given any ﬁxed set of
beliefs at ﬁnite orders and a ﬁxed equilibrium behavior in a ﬁxed type space,
we can envision a coherent type whose lower-order beliefs are as the former
but whose higher-order beliefs assigns high probability to the latter. That type
will give a best reply to the equilibrium in the latter. Hence, multiplicity of
equilibria in various type spaces tends to yield high variability of equilibria
with respect to the higher-order beliefs in universal type space. This intuition,
however, does not yield a proof. This is because the distinctions among the
types in Brandenburger and Dekel are all payoﬀ irrelevant, and thus their type
spaces are not contained in the universal type space. More importantly, the
equilibrium behavior in various type spaces need not be diﬀerent within a ﬁxed
equilibrium. In fact, Brandenburger and Dekel use a single type space in their
proof; hence, if their type space were contained in the universal type space, the
equilibrium behavior in this type space would be uniquely determined by the
equilibrium in the universal type space.
Our next example shows that either of the inclusions in Proposition 1 may
be strict. Hence, (i) some rationalizable strategies may not be in A∞
i , showing
the distinction between the results of Brandenburger and Dekel and ours, and
(ii) A∞
i may include some weakly dominated strategies, distinguishing our result
from the characterization of Brandenburger and Keisler (2000).FINITE-ORDER IMPLICATIONS 17
Example 1. Take N = {1,2}, Θ = {θ0,θ 1}, and let the action spaces and the
payoﬀ functions for each θ be given by
a0 a1
a0 0,0 0,0
a1 0,0 1,1
.
(Note that θ is not payoﬀ relevant.) Deﬁne s∗ by
s
∗
i (ti)=



a0 if ti = tCK
i (θ0);
a1 otherwise.
Clearly, for each k ≥ 1,w eh a v eWk
i [ti]={a1} and Sk
i [ti]={a0,a 1} for each
ti,w h i l eAk
i
£
s∗;tCK
i (θ0)
¤
= {a0,a 1},a n dAk
i
£
s∗;tCK
i (θ1)
¤
= {a1}.
Proposition 1 yields a characterization whenever the payoﬀsa r eg e n e r i ci n
the following (standard) sense.
Deﬁnition 1. We say that the payoﬀs are generic at θ iﬀ there do not exist i,
non-zero α ∈ RAi, and distinct ai, a0
i, a−i,a n da0
−i such that (i) ui (θ,ai,a −i)=
ui (θ,a0
i,a −i) or (ii)
P
ai α(ai)ui (θ,ai,a −i)=
P
ai α(ai)ui
¡
θ,ai,a 0
−i
¢
=0 .
When the payoﬀs are generic at ¯ θ and it is common knowledge that θ = ¯ θ,
then any action that is not strictly dominated will be a strict best reply against
some belief (at each round), and hence the two elimination processes will be
equivalent. In that case, Proposition 1 yields the following characterization.
Corollary 1. For any ﬁnite-action game and any equilibrium s∗ with full range,
if the payoﬀsa r eg e n e r i ca ts o m eθ, then for each i and k,
A
k
i
£
s
∗,t
CK
i (θ)
¤
= S
k
i
£
t
CK
i (θ)
¤
.18 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
That is, in generic ﬁnite-action games, a researcher’s predictions based on
ﬁnite orders of players’ beliefs and equilibrium will be equivalent to the predic-
tions that follow from rationalizability. This characterization will be generalized
to the following widely-used class of games.
4. Nice games
We will now consider a class of “nice” games (Moulin (1984)), which are
widely used in economic theory, such as imperfect competition, spatial compe-
tition, provision of public goods, theory of the ﬁrm, etc. We will show that
Ak
i [s∗,t i]=Sk
i [ti] for each k whenever equilibrium s∗ has full range.
Deﬁnition 2. Ag a m eiss a idt obenice iﬀ for each i, Ai =[ 0 ,1] and ui (θ,ai,a −i)
is continuous in a =( ai,a −i) and strictly concave in ai.
We use the strict concavity assumption to make sure that a player’s utility
function for any ﬁxed strategy proﬁl eo ft h eo t h e r si sa l w a y ss i n g l e - p e a k e di n
his own action. (Single-peakedness is not preserved in presence of uncertainty.)
We use the continuity assumption to make sure that a player’s strategy best
response is continuous with respect to the other players’ strategies. For the
complete information types, our results in this section will be true under the
weaker condition that ui (θ,·,a −i) is single-peaked with a maximand that is
continuous in a−i. Now, since our players have always unique best reply, our
elimination processes will be equivalent, yielding the functional equation
(4.1) W = S.FINITE-ORDER IMPLICATIONS 19
Moreover, our next lemma ensures that, despite our uncountable action spaces,
we only need to consider countably many actions for types with countable sup-
ports, allowing us to circumvent the measurability issue discussed in Remark
1.
Lemma 2. For any nice game, for any i, ti, k,a n da n yai ∈ Sk
i [ti],t h e r ee x i s t s
ˆ s−i ∈ ˆ S
k−1
−i such that
BRi (π(·|ti, ˆ s−i)) = {ai}.
Together with (4.1), Lemma 2 gives us our main result for this section.
Proposition 2. For any nice game, let s∗ be any equilibrium with full range.
Let also ˆ Θ × ˆ T be a countable subset of Θ × T such that for each ˆ ti ∈ ˆ Ti,
suppκˆ ti ⊆ ˆ Θ × ˆ T−i. Then, for any k ∈ N, i ∈ N,a n dˆ ti ∈ ˆ Ti,
S
k
i
£
ˆ ti
¤
= A
k
i
£
s
∗,ˆ ti
¤
;
in particular,
S
∞
i
£
ˆ ti
¤
= A
∞
i
£
s
∗,ˆ ti
¤
.
Proof. For any ai ∈ Sk
i
£
ˆ ti
¤
= Wk
i
£
ˆ ti
¤
, by Lemma 2, there exists ˆ s−i ∈ ˆ S
k−1
−i =
ˆ W
k−1
−i such that ai is a strict best reply against π(·|ti, ˆ s−i).S i n c eκˆ ti has count-
able support, P
¡
·|ˆ ti, ˆ s−i
¢
, the probability distribution induced by κˆ ti and ˆ s−i
on Θ × L × A−i, has a countable support:
suppP
¡
·|ˆ ti, ˆ s−i
¢
= {(θ,l,ˆ s−i (θ,l,h))|(θ,l,h) ∈ suppκti}.
Hence our proof of Proposition 1 applies. That is, there exists ˜ ti ∈ Ti (not
necessarily in ˆ Ti) such that s∗
i
¡
˜ ti
¢
= ai and ˜ tm
i = ˆ tm
i for each m ≤ k. ¤20 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
5. Extensions
For ease of exposition, we have so far focused on pure strategy equilibria
with full range. In this section, we will extend our results for mixed strategy
equilibria and beyond the full-range assumption.
5.1. Mixed Strategies. Since all equilibria in nice games are in pure strate-
gies, we will focus on the countable-action games. Using interim formulation,
we deﬁne a mixed strategy as any measurable function σi : Ti → ∆(Ai).
A mixed strategy proﬁle σ∗ is Bayesian Nash equilibrium iﬀ suppσ∗
i (ti) ⊆
BRi
¡
π
¡
·|ti,σ∗
−i
¢¢
for each i and ti.W r i t i n g Tσ∗
i = {ti||suppσ∗
i (ti)| =1 } for
the set of types who play pure strategies, we deﬁne a mapping sσ∗
i : Tσ∗
i → Ai
by suppσ∗
i (ti)=
©
sσ∗
i (ti)
ª
.W et h e nu s et h i s“ p u r ep a r to f ”σ∗ to extend our
previous deﬁnitions and results to mixed strategies. We say that σ∗ has full
range iﬀ sσ∗ ¡
Tσ∗¢
= A and set
A
k
i [σ
∗;ti]=
©
s
σ∗
i
¡
˜ ti
¢
|˜ ti ∈ T
σ∗
i ,˜ t
m
i = t
m
i ∀m ≤ k
ª
,
the set of all actions that are played with probability 1 under σ∗ by some type
˜ ti whose ﬁrst k orders of beliefs are identical to those of ti. Clearly, every
equilibrium has full range under Assumption 1, i.e., when Θ is suﬃciently rich.
Proposition 3. For any countable-action game, any (possibly mixed strategy)
equilibrium σ∗ with full range, any k ≤∞ , i ∈ N,a n da n yti,
W
k
i [ti] ⊆ A
k
i [σ
∗,t i] ⊆ S
k
i [ti].
Proof. In the proof of Proposition 1, insert sσ∗ everywhere s∗ appears, and
restrict the range of µ and the domain of γ to Θ × Tσ∗
−i. Notice that, by (3.3),
˜ ti ∈ Tσ∗
i . ¤FINITE-ORDER IMPLICATIONS 21
That is, if σ∗ has full range (e.g., if Θ is suﬃciently rich) and we know only the
ﬁrst k orders of a player’s beliefs, then for any ai ∈ Wk
i [ti], we cannot rule out
that ai is played with probability 1 according to σ∗.F o rk ≥ 1, the full-range
assumption can replaced by the weaker assumption that Ai ⊆∪ ti suppσ∗
i (ti).
5.2. Without full range. Our full range assumption allowed us to consider
large changes. A researcher may be certain that it is common knowledge that the
set of parameters are restricted to a small subset, or equivalently, the equilibrium
considered may not vary much as the beliefs about the underlying uncertainty
change. We will now present extension of our main result to such cases.
Local Rationalizability.F o ra n yB1 ×···×Bn ⊂ A,d e ﬁne sets Sk
i [B;ti],
i ∈ N, k ∈ N, ti ∈ Ti, by setting
S
0
i [B;ti]=Bi,
S
k
i [B;ti]=
[
σ−i∈∆(ˆ Sk−1
−i [B])
BRi (π(·|ti,σ−i)),
where ˆ S
k−1
−i [B] ⊂ M−i is the set of all measurable functions f : Θ × T−i → A−i
such that f (θ,t−i) ∈ S
k−1
−i [B;t−i] for each t−i. N o t i c et h a tt h i si st h es a m e
procedure as iterated strict dominance, except that the initial set is restricted
to a subset. Unlike iterated strict dominance, these sets can become larger as
k increases. Hence we deﬁne the set of locally rationalizable strategies by
S
∞
i [B;ti]=
∞ \
k=0
∞ [
m=k
S
m
i [B;ti].
Notice that the set S∞[B;ti] may be much larger than B.W e d e ﬁne local
version of W∞, similarly, by setting W0
i [B;ti]=Bi,
W
k
i [B;ti]=
n
ai ∈ Ai|BRi
¡
θ
i,σ−i
¢
= {ai} for some σ−i ∈ ∆
³
ˆ W
k−1
−i [B]
´o
,
and W∞
i [B;ti]=
T∞
k=0
S∞
m=k Wm
i [B;ti].N o t i c et h a tw ec o n s i d e ra l la c t i o n si n
our process, which is no longer an elimination process.22 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
Proposition 4. For any equilibrium s∗, if the game has countable action spaces,
then
W
k
i [s
∗ (T);ti] ⊆ A
k
i [s
∗,t i] ⊆ S
k
i [s
∗ (T);ti]( ∀i,k,ti);
if the game is nice, then with notation of Proposition 2, for any B ⊆ s∗ (T),
S
k
i
£
B;ˆ ti
¤
⊆ A
k
i [s
∗,t i]=S
k
i
£
s
∗ (T);ˆ ti
¤¡
∀i,k,ˆ ti
¢
.
The last statement implies that, for nice games, even the slight changes in
very higher-order beliefs will have substantial impact on equilibrium behavior,
unless the game is locally dominance-solvable. There are important games in
which a slight failure of common knowledge assumption in very high orders leads
to substantially diﬀerent outcomes–as in Section 7.
6. Continuity of Equilibrium
It is well known that equilibrium may be discontinuous with respect to the
product topology. In this section we will introduce our notion of continuity with
respect to higher-order beliefs, which appears much weaker than continuity with
respect to the product topology. We will show that even this weaker continuity
property is violated in every equilibrium on a very large set.
6.1. Equilibrium in pure strategies. We consider an arbitrary metric d on
A. A sequence (am)m∈N is said to converge to some a ∈ A iﬀ for each  >0,
there exists k such that d(am,a) < for each m>k . Given any subset B ⊆ A,
we write D(B)=s u p {d(a,b)|a,b ∈ B} for the diameter of B.A s u s u a l , w e
write Ak [s∗,t]=
Q
i Ak
i [s∗,t i], Sk [s∗,t]=
Q
i Sk
i [ti],e t c .
Deﬁnition 3. An equilibrium s∗ is said to be continuous (with respect to prod-
uct topology) at t iﬀ for each sequence
¡
˜ t[m]
¢
m∈N of type proﬁles
£
˜ t
k [m] → t
k ∀k
¤
⇒
£
s
∗ ¡
˜ t[m]
¢
→ s
∗ (t)
¤
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An equilibrium s∗ is said to be continuous with respect to higher-order beliefs at
t iﬀ for each  >0, there exists k such that for each ˜ t,
£
˜ t
m = t
m ∀m ≤ k
¤
⇒ d
¡
s
∗ ¡
˜ t
¢
,s
∗ (t)
¢
<  .
The latter continuity concept is uniform continuity with respect to the prod-
uct topology (on the type space) of discrete topologies on each order of beliefs.
Of course, continuity with respect to discrete topology is much weaker than
other topologies. The next lemma presents some basic facts.
Lemma 3. For any equilibrium s∗ and for any t, the following are true.
(1) If s∗ is continuous at t,t h e ns∗ is continuous with respect to higher-order
beliefs at t.
(2) s∗ is continuous with respect to higher-order beliefs at t iﬀ D
¡
Ak [s∗,t]
¢
→
0 as k →∞ .
(3) If s∗ is continuous with respect to higher-order beliefs at t,t h e nA∞ [s∗,t]=
{s∗ (t)}.
For nice games, Lemma 3.3 and Proposition 2 imply that if an equilibrium
s∗ with full range is continuous with respect to higher-order beliefs at t,t h e n
S∞[t]={s∗ (t)}, yielding the following discontinuity result. (One can obtain
a similar result for countable-action games by replacing S∞ [t]={s∗ (t)} with
|W∞[t]| ≤ 1.)
Proposition 5. For any nice game, every equilibrium s∗ with full range is dis-
continuous with respect to the higher-order beliefs (and the product topology) at
each type proﬁle t for which there are more than one rationalizable action pro-
ﬁles. In particular, if a nice game possesses an equilibrium s∗ that is continuous
with respect to higher-order beliefs or with respect to the product topology, then
t h eg a m ei sd o m i n a n c es o l v a b l e .24 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
6.2. Mixed-strategy equilibria in ﬁnite-action games. Endow the space
o fm i x e da c t i o np r o ﬁles, ∆(A), with an arbitrary metric d.E x t e n dt h ed e ﬁni-
tions of continuity with respect to product topology and higher-order beliefs to
mixed-strategy equilibria σ∗ by replacing s∗ with σ∗ in Deﬁnition 3.
Deﬁnition 4. A mixed-strategy equilibrium σ∗ is said to be weakly continuous
with respect to higher-order beliefs at t iﬀ there exists k such that for each ˜ t,
£
˜ t
m = t
m ∀m ≤ k
¤
⇒ supp
¡
σ
∗ ¡
˜ t
¢¢
∩ supp(σ
∗ (t)) 6= ∅.
Now, continuity in product topology implies continuity with respect to higher-
order beliefs. For ﬁnite-action games, the latter in turn implies weak continuity
with respect to higher-order beliefs, as we show in the Appendix (see Lemma
6). There we also show that strong and weak continuity of σ∗ at t with respect
to higher-order beliefs imply that |A∞ [σ∗,t]| ≤ 1 and A∞ [σ∗,t] ⊆ supp(σ∗ (t)),
respectively. This yields the following result.
Proposition 6. For any ﬁnite-action game and any equilibrium σ∗ with full
range, |W∞ [t]| ≤ 1whenever (i) σ∗ is continuous with respect to higher-order
beliefs at t, or (ii) σ∗ is weakly continuous with respect to higher-order beliefs
at t and σ∗ (t) is pure.
Proof. Either of the conditions (i) and (ii) implies that |A∞ [σ∗,t]| ≤ 1 (see
Lemma 6). Hence, by Proposition 3, |W∞ [t]| ≤ |A∞ [σ∗,t]| ≤ 1. ¤
That is, for suﬃciently rich Θ, every equilibrium is discontinuous with respect
to higher-order beliefs (and the product topology) at each type proﬁle for which
two or more action proﬁles survive iterated elimination of strategies that can-
not be a strict best reply. These type proﬁles include the generic instances ofFINITE-ORDER IMPLICATIONS 25
complete-information without dominance solvability. At each such type proﬁle,
even the weakest continuity property fails if the equilibrium actions are pure.
Example 2. Consider the coordinated attack game with payoﬀ matrix
Attack No Attack
Attack 1,1 -2,0
No Attack 0,-2 0,0
where there are two pure strategy equilibria: the eﬃcient equilibrium (Attack,
Attack) and the risk-dominant equilibrium (No Attack, No Attack). Since
each action is a strict best reply, no action is eliminated in our elimination
process. Therefore, Lemma 1 and Proposition 6 imply that when we embed the
coordinated-attack game in a rich type space as a type proﬁle, every equilibrium
must be discontinuous with respect to higher-order beliefs at that type proﬁle.
Rubinstein’s (1989) electronic-mail game presents a type space in which any
equilibrium that selects the eﬃcient equilibrium in the coordinated-attack game
must be discontinuous with respect to higher-order uncertainty. In that example
there is also a continuous equilibrium, which selects the risk-dominant action
proﬁle for each type proﬁle. Our example shows that the latter continuous
equilibrium is an artifact of the small type space utilized, and in fact in a rich
type space, no equilibrium could have been robust against higher-order beliefs,
and thus every equilibrium theory would have been sensitive to the assumptions
about higher-order uncertainty, strengthening Rubinstein’s position.
Following Carlsson and Van Damme (1993), global games literature investi-
gate the equilibria in nearby type proﬁles that are generated by a model that
is closed at the ﬁrst order. At these type proﬁles, the game is dominant solv-
able, and the resulting equilibrium action proﬁle converges to the risk-dominant
equilibrium as these type proﬁles approach the coordinated-attack game. In this26 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
way, they select the risk-dominant equilibrium. Our result uncovers a diﬃculty
in this methodology: every equilibrium must be discontinuous at the limit-
ing type proﬁle, and an equilibrium selection argument based on continuity
is problematic–as there is another path that we could have taken the limit in
which we would have selected the other equilibrium. This is despite the fact that
the equilibrium outcome is robust against higher-order beliefs in these nearby
type proﬁles themselves (by Proposition 8 in the Appendix.)
On a positive note, Kajii and Morris (1997) show that the risk-dominant equi-
librium is robust to incomplete information under common prior assumption.
That is, if the common prior puts suﬃciently high weight on the original game,
then the incomplete information game has an equilibrium in which the risk-
dominant equilibrium is played with high probability according to the common
prior. Similar positive results are obtained by others, such as Ui (2001), Morris
and Ui (2003). This suggests that, when there is a common prior, it may put
low probability on the paths that converge to other equilibria.
7. Application: Cournot Oligopoly
In a linear Cournot duopoly, the game is dominant-solvable, and hence Propo-
sition 8 (in the Appendix) implies that higher-order beliefs have negligible im-
pact on equilibrium. (This has also been shown by Weinstein and Yildiz (2003)
and is also implied by a result of Nyarko (1996).) On the other hand, in a linear
Cournot duopoly with three or more ﬁrms, any production level that is less
than or equal to the monopoly production is rationalizable, and hence Propo-
sition 2 implies that a researcher cannot rule out any such output level for a
ﬁrm no matter how many orders of beliefs he speciﬁes. We will now show a
more disturbing fact. Focusing complete-information types, tCK (θ), for fairly
general oligopoly models we will show that when there are suﬃciently manyFINITE-ORDER IMPLICATIONS 27
ﬁrms, any such outcome will be in S∞
i
£
B;tCK (θ)
¤
for every neighborhood B of
s∗ ¡
tCK (θ)
¢
. Therefore, by Proposition 4, even a slight doubt about the model
in very high orders will lead a researcher to fail to rule out any outcome that is
less than monopoly outcome as a ﬁrm’s equilibrium output.
General Cournot Model.C o n s i d e rn ﬁrms with identical constant marginal
cost c>0. Simultaneously, each ﬁrm i produces qi at cost qic and sell its
output at price P (Q;θ) where Q =
P
i qi is the total supply. For some ﬁxed
¯ θ,w ea s s u m et h a tΘ is a closed interval with ¯ θ ∈ Θ 6=
©¯ θ
ª
.W e a l s o a s -
sume that P
¡
0;¯ θ
¢
> 0, P
¡
·;¯ θ
¢
is strictly decreasing when it is is positive, and
limQ→∞ P
¡
Q;¯ θ
¢
=0 . Therefore, there exists a unique ˆ Q such that
P
³
ˆ Q;¯ θ
´
= c.
(In order to have a nice game, we can impose an upper bound for q, larger
than ˆ Q, without aﬀecting the equilibria.) We assume that, on [0, ˆ Q], P
¡
·;¯ θ
¢
is
continuously twice-diﬀerentiable and
P
0 + QP
00 < 0.
It is well known that, under the assumptions of the model, (i) the proﬁt
function, u
¡
q,Q;¯ θ
¢
= q(P (q + Q) − c), is strictly concave in own output q; (ii)
the unique best response q∗ (Q−i) to others’ aggregate production Q−i is strictly
decreasing on [0, ˆ Q] with slope bounded away from 0 (i.e., ∂q∗/∂Q−i ≤ λ for
some λ<0); (iii) equilibrium outcome at tCK ¡¯ θ
¢
, s∗ ¡
tCK ¡¯ θ
¢¢
, is unique and
symmetric (Okuguchi and Suzumura (1971)).
Lemma 4. In the general Cournot model, for any equilibrium s∗,t h e r ee x i s t s
¯ n<∞ such that for any n>¯ n and any B =
£
s∗
1
¡
tCK
1
¡¯ θ
¢¢
−  ,s∗
1
¡
tCK
1
¡¯ θ
¢¢
+  
¤n ⊂
A with  >0, we have
S
∞
i
£
B;t
CK ¡¯ θ
¢¤
=
£
0,q
M¤
(∀i ∈ N),28 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
where qM is the monopoly output under P
¡
·;¯ θ
¢
.
Proof. Let ¯ n be any integer greater than 1+1 /|λ|,w h e r eλ is as in (ii). Take
any n>¯ n. By (iii), B =[ q0, ¯ q0]n for some q0, ¯ q0 with q0 < ¯ q0. By (ii), for any
k>0, Sk £
B;tCK ¡¯ θ
¢¤
=[ qk, ¯ qk]n,w h e r e
¯ q
k = q
∗ ¡
(n − 1)q
k−1¢
and q
k = q
∗ ¡
(n − 1) ¯ q
k−1¢
.
Deﬁne Q
k ≡ (n − 1)qk, ¯ Qk ≡ (n − 1) ¯ qk,a n dQ∗ =( n − 1)q∗,s ot h a t
¯ Q
k = Q
∗ ¡
Q
k−1¢
and Q
k = Q
∗ ¡ ¯ Q
k−1¢
.
Since (n − 1)λ<1,t h es l o p eo fQ∗ is strictly less than −1. Hence Q
k decreases
with k and becomes 0 at some ﬁnite ¯ k,a n d ¯ Qk increases with k and takes value
Q∗ (0) = (n − 1)qM at ¯ k+1.T h a ti s ,Sk £
B;tCK ¡¯ θ
¢¤
=
£
0,qM¤n for each k>¯ k.
Therefore, S∞ £
B;tCK ¡¯ θ
¢¤
=
£
0,qM¤n. ¤
Together with Proposition 4, this lemma yields the following.
Proposition 7. In the general Cournot model, assume that Θ =
£¯ θ − ε,¯ θ + ε
¤
for arbitrarily small ε>0, and that the best-response function q∗ (Q−i;θ) is
a continuous and strictly increasing function of θ at
¡
Q−i,¯ θ
¢
where Q−i =
(n − 1)s∗
j
¡
tCK ¡¯ θ
¢¢
is the others’ aggregate output in equilibrium. Then,
A
∞
i
£
s
∗,t
CK
i
¡¯ θ
¢¤
=
£
0,q
M¤
(∀i ∈ N),
where qM is the monopoly output under P
¡
·;¯ θ
¢
.
Proof. By (i) above, we have a nice game. By the hypothesis, there exists
B ⊂ s∗ (T) as in Lemma 4. Hence, Lemma 4 and Proposition 4 imply
£
0,q
M¤
= S
∞
i
£
B;t
CK
i
¡¯ θ
¢¤
⊆ A
∞
i
£
s
∗,t
CK
i
¡¯ θ
¢¤
⊆
£
0,q
M¤
,
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In Proposition 7, the assumption that q∗ (Q−i;θ) is responsive to θ guaranties
that θ is a payoﬀ-relevant parameter. Our proposition suggests that, with suf-
ﬁciently many ﬁrms, any equilibrium prediction that is not implied by strict
dominance will be invalid whenever we slightly deviate from the idealized com-
plete information model. To see this, consider the conﬁdent researcher and his
slightly skeptical friend in the Introduction. The former is conﬁdent that it
is common knowledge that θ = ¯ θ, while the latter is only willing to concede
that it is common knowledge that
¯ ¯θ − ¯ θ
¯ ¯ ≤ ε and agrees with the kth-order
mutual knowledge of θ = ¯ θ. He is an arbitrarily generous skeptic; he is willing
to concede the above for arbitrarily small ε>0 and arbitrarily large ﬁnite k.
Our proposition states that the skeptic nonetheless cannot rule out any output
level that is not strictly dominated.
8. Conclusion
It is a common practice in economics to close the model after only specifying
the ﬁrst or second order beliefs, using a (mostly implicit) common knowledge
assumption. In this paper, we have investigated the role of this assumption in
predictions according to an arbitrary ﬁxed equilibrium. Finding strong lower
and upper bounds for the variations with respect to this assumption, we have
shown that it is this casually made common knowledge assumption that drives
any prediction that we could not have made already by iteratively eliminating
strategies that can never be strict best reply. In games like Cournot oligopoly,
this implies that no interesting conclusions could have been reached without
making a precise common knowledge assumption. In some other games, such
as sequential games, our lower bounds are weak, and one may plausibly make
sharp predictions using much weaker assumptions. Therefore, it is essential for
assuring the reliability of theories to pay special care to closing assumption and
justify it at least as much as the other assumptions.30 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
When there are two or more actions that survive our elimination process,
there is an inherent unpredictability which cannot be avoided without making
an assumption on inﬁnitely many orders of beliefs, as all of these actions are
played with probability 1 by some types whose ﬁnite-order beliefs agree for
arbitrarily high orders. In that case, equilibrium is necessarily discontinuous
with respect to higher-order beliefs and in product topology. Moreover, when
there are no ties, there is a one-to-one relationship between this sensitivity to
higher-order beliefs and sensitivity to higher-order assumptions about players’
rationality. It then becomes very diﬃcult in analyzing these situations to justify
the common knowledge of rationality as a good approximating assumption.
Appendix A. Proofs and further results
P r o o fo fL e m m a1 .Take any i and any ai.T a k e a n y γ ∈ ∆(T−i) with countable
support, and let µ = γ ◦
¡
s∗
−i
¢−1 ∈ ∆(A−i).L e tν be as in Assumption 1. Deﬁne ti
as the type such that κti = ν×γ.N o t i c et h a tπ
¡
·|ti,s ∗
−i
¢
= κti◦β−1 =( ν × γ)◦β−1 =
ν×
³
γ ◦
¡
s∗
−i
¢−1´
= ν×µ. Hence, s∗ (ti)=BRi
¡
π
¡
·|ti,s ∗
−i
¢¢
= BRi (ν × µ)=ai. ¤
Proposition 8. For any equilibrium s∗, any player i,a n da n yti and k ≤∞ ,
Ak
i [s∗,t i] ⊆ Sk
i [ti].
Proof. For k =0 , the proposition is true by deﬁnition. Assume that it is true for
some k − 1 ≥ 0, i.e., for any i,a n df o rf o re a c ht−i, Ak−1
−i [s∗,t −i] ⊆ Sk−1
−i [t−i].N o w ,
T−i ⊂ L × H where L =
³Qk−1
l=1 ˆ ∆(Xl−1)
´n−1
and H =
³Q∞
l=k ˆ ∆(Xl−1)
´n−1
are the
spaces of lower and higher-order beliefs with generic members l and h, respectively.6
Now take any ˜ ti with ˜ tm
i = tm
i for all m ≤ k.C l e a r l y ,
(A.1) margΘ×Lκ˜ ti = margΘ×Lκti.
6T−i 6= L × H because of the coherency requirement, which has no impact on the rest of
the proof. (κti and κ˜ ti put probability 1 on the subset T−i.)FINITE-ORDER IMPLICATIONS 31
For each (θ,l) ∈ Θ×L with margΘ×Lκ˜ ti (θ,l) ≡ κ˜ ti ({(θ,l)}×H) > 0,l e tP
¡
·|θ,l,s∗
−i
¢
be the the probability distribution on A−i induced by the belief ˜ ti and s∗
−i conditional
on (θ,l),i . e . ,
(A.2) P
¡
a−i|θ,l,s∗
−i
¢
= κ˜ ti
¡©
(θ,l,h)|s∗
−i (l,h)=a−i
ª¢
/κ˜ ti ({(θ,l)}×H)
at each a−i. Since there are only countably many (θ,l) with margΘ×Lκ˜ ti (θ,l) > 0,
there exists σ−i ∈ ∆(M−i) such that σ−i ({s−i|s−i (θ,l,h)=a−i})=P
¡
a−i|θ,l,s∗
−i
¢
for each such (θ,l),a n dσ−i ({s−i|s−i (θ,t−i)=ˆ s−i (θ,t−i)})=1otherwise for some
ﬁxed ˆ s−i ∈ ˆ Sk−1
−i . Note that according to σ−i,a te a c h(θ,l) in the support and for
each a−i, the probability that a−i is played is always P
¡
a−i|θ,l,s∗
−i
¢
. By induction
hypothesis, we then have
(A.3) σ−i
³n
s−i|s−i (θ,l,h) ∈ Sk−1
−i [(l,h)]
o´
=1 .
Moreover, for each
¡¯ θ,a−i
¢
with t1
i
¡¯ θ
¢
= ˜ t1
i
¡¯ θ
¢
> 0,
π ((θ,a−i)|ti,σ−i)=
Z
1{θ=¯ θ}P
¡
a−i|θ,l,s∗
−i
¢
dκti (θ,l,h)
=
Z
1{θ=¯ θ}P
¡
a−i|θ,l,s∗
−i
¢
κti ({(θ,l)}×H)dmargΘ×Lκti (θ,l)
=
Z
1{θ=¯ θ}κ˜ ti
¡©
(θ,l,h)|s∗
−i (l,h)=a−i
ª¢
dmargΘ×Ldκ˜ ti (θ,l)
= π
¡
(θ,a−i)|˜ ti,s ∗
−i
¢
,
where 1{θ=¯ θ} is the indicator function for
©
θ = ¯ θ
ª
;t h eﬁrst equality is obtained
by integrating over σ−i appropriately; the second equality is due to the fact that
P
¡
a−i|θ,l,s∗
−i
¢
does not depend on h, and the third equality is due to (A.1) and (A.2).
When t1
i (θ)=˜ t1
i (θ)=0 ,w et r i v i a l l yh a v eπ((θ,a−i)|ti,σ−i)=π
¡
(θ,a−i)|˜ ti,s ∗
−i
¢
=
0. Hence,
s∗
i
¡
˜ ti
¢
∈ BRi
¡
π
¡
·|˜ ti,s ∗
−i
¢¢
= BRi (π (·|ti,σ−i)) ⊂ Sk
i [ti],
where the last inclusion is by (A.3) and deﬁnition of Sk
i [ti]. ¤
P r o o fo fL e m m a2 .It follows from the following lemma. ¤
Lemma 5. For any nice game and for any i, ti, k, the following are true.32 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
(1) Sk
i [ti]=
£
ak,¯ ak¤
for some ak
i ,¯ ak
i ∈ Ai, which depend on ti.
(2) For each ak
i ∈ Sk
i [ti],t h e r ee x i s t sˆ s−i ∈ ˆ Sk−1
−i such that
BRi (π (·|ti, ˆ s−i)) = {ak
i }.
Proof. We will use induction on k.F o rk =0 , part 1 is true by deﬁnition. Assume
that part 1 is true for some k − 1,i . e . ,Sk−1
j [tj] is a closed interval in Aj =[ 0 ,1]
for each j. This implies that ˆ Sk−1
−i is a closed, convex metric space (with product
topology).7 Moreover, by the Maximum Theorem, BRi (π (·|ti,s −i)) is an upper-semi-
continuous function of s−i. But by the strict concavity assumption, BRi (π (·|ti,s −i))
is singleton, and hence the function βi (·;ti) that maps each s−i ∈ ˆ Sk−1
−i to the unique
member of BRi (π (·|ti,s −i)) is continuous. Since ˆ Sk−1
−i is compact and convex, this
implies that βi
³
ˆ Sk−1
−i ;ti
´
is compact and connected, and hence it is convex as it is
unidimensional. That is, βi
³
ˆ Sk−1
−i ;ti
´
=
£
ak,¯ ak¤
for some ak
i ,¯ ak
i ∈ Ai.W eclaim that
βi
³
ˆ Sk−1
−i ;ti
´
= Sk
i [ti]. This readily proves part 1. Part 2 follows from the deﬁnition
of βi
³
ˆ Sk−1
−i ;ti
´
.
Towards proving our claim,f o re a c h(θ,t−i) ∈ suppκti and for each s−i ∈ ˆ Sk−1
−i ,
deﬁne function Ui (·|θ,t−i,s −i) by setting Ui (ai|θ,t−i,s −i)=ui (θ,ai,s −i (θ,t−i)) at
each ai. Clearly, Ui is strictly concave, and for each σ−i ∈ ∆
³
ˆ Sk−1
−i
´
, the expected
payoﬀ of type ti is
(A.4)
Z
Ui (ai|θ,t−i,s −i)dκti (θ,t−i)dσ−i (s−i).
Now, take any ai > ¯ ak
i . Then, for each (θ,t−i,s −i),b yd e ﬁnition of ¯ ak
i and strict
concavity of Ui (·|θ,t−i,s −i),w eh a v eUi (ai|θ,t−i,s −i) <U i
¡
¯ ak
i |θ,t−i,s −i
¢
.I t t h e n
follows from (A.4) that ¯ ak
i yields higher expected payoﬀ than ai for each σ−i ∈
∆
³
ˆ Sk−1
−i
´
, and thus ai 6∈ Si [ti]. Similarly, ai 6∈ Si [ti] for each ai <a k
i . ¤
7Proof: Firstly,
Q
(θ,tj,j) S
k−1
j [tj] is a compact space by Tychonoﬀ’s theorem. But the
space of all measurable functions f : Θ × T−i → RN\{i} is closed. Hence, the intersection of
these two spaces, namely ˆ S
k−1
−i , is compact. Convexity of ˆ S
k−1
−i follows from the facts that
measurability is preserved under point-wise multiplication and addition and that the range is
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P r o o fo fL e m m a3 .Part 2 follows from the deﬁnitions, and Part 3 follows from Part
2a n dt h ef a c tt h a tD(A∞ [s∗,t]) ≤ D
¡
Ak [s∗,t]
¢
for each k. To prove Part 1, take
any  >0 and any sequence  k > 0 that converges to 0.F o re a c hk, there exists ˜ t[k]
such that ˜ tm [k]=tm for each m ≤ k and d
¡
s∗ ¡
˜ t[k]
¢
,s ∗ (t)
¢
≥ D
¡
Ak [s∗,t]
¢
/2 −  k
so that
(A.5) 0 ≤ D
³
Ak [s∗,t]
´
≤ 2d
¡
s∗ ¡
˜ t[k]
¢
,s ∗ (t)
¢
+2  k.
But, by deﬁnition, for each m and each k>m , ˜ tm [k]=tm, and hence ˜ tm [k] → tm as
k →∞ . Hence, if s∗ is continuous at t,t h e na sk →∞ , s∗ ¡
˜ t[k]
¢
→ s∗ (t), and thus
the right hand side of (A.5) converges to 0. That is, D
¡
Ak [s∗,t]
¢
→ 0, showing by
part 2 that s∗ is continuous with respect to higher-order beliefs at t. ¤
Lemma 6. For any ﬁnite-action game, the following propositions are ordered with
logical implication in the following decreasing order.
(1) σ∗ is continuous with respect to product topology at t.
(2) σ∗ is continuous with respect to higher-order beliefs at t.
(3) σ∗ is weakly continuous with respect to higher-order beliefs at t.
(4) A∞ [σ∗,t] ⊆ supp(σ∗ (t)).
Moreover, (2) implies that |A∞ [σ∗,t]| ≤ 1.
Proof. Since mixed strategies can be considered as pure strategies with values in
∆(Ai), by Lemma 3.1, (1) implies (2). To show that (2) implies (3), for each B ⊆ A,
write ΣB = {α ∈ ∆(A)|supp(α) ⊆ B}, which is a compact set. Then, for each
disjoint B and C, dB,C =m i n{d(αB,α C)|αB ∈ ΣB,α C ∈ ΣC} > 0.W r i t e dmin for
the minimum of dB,C among all disjoint B and C.C l e a r l y ,i fd(α,α0) <d min,t h e n
the supports of α and α0 have non-empty intersection. But (2) implies that there
exists k such that whenever ˜ tm = tm for each m ≤ k, d
¡
σ∗ ¡
˜ t
¢
,σ∗ (t)
¢
<d min/2,
whence supp
¡
σ∗ ¡
˜ t
¢¢
∩supp(σ∗ (t)) 6= ∅–hence (3). (3) implies (4) because for each
a ∈ A∞ [σ∗,t] and each k,t h e r ee x i s t s˜ t such that ˜ tm = tm for each m ≤ k and
supp
¡
σ∗ ¡
˜ t
¢¢
= {a}. The last statement in the lemma also follows from the latter34 JONATHAN WEINSTEIN AND MUHAMET YILDIZ
observation because σ∗ (t) cannot be arbitrarily close to two distinct pure action
proﬁles. ¤
References
[1] Aumann, R. and A. Brandenburger (1995): “Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilib-
rium,” Econometrica, 63, 1161-1180.
[2] Battigalli, P. and M. Siniscalchi (2003): “Strong Belief and Forward-Induction Reason-
ing,” Journal of Economic Theory, 106, 356-391.
[3] Battigalli, P. and M. Siniscalchi (2003) “Rationalization and Incomplete Information,”
Advances in Theoretical Economics, Vol. 3: No. 1, Article 3.
[4] Bergemann, D. and S. Morris (2003): “Robust Mechanism Design,” mimeo.
[5] Bernheim, D. (1984): “Rationalizable strategic behavior,” Econometrica, 52, 1007-1028.
[6] Brandenburger, A. and E. Dekel (1987): “Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria,”
Econometrica, 55, 1391-1402.
[7] Brandenburger, A. and E. Dekel (1993): “Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowl-
edge,” Journal of Economic Theory, 59, 189-198.
[8] Brandenburger, A. and Keisler (2000): “Epistemic Conditions for Iterated Admissibility,”
mimeo.
[9] Carlsson, H. and E. van Damme (1993): “Global Games and Equilibrium Selection,”
Econometrica, 61, 989-1018.
[10] Feinberg, Y. (2002): “Subjective Reasoning in Dynamic Games,” mimeo.
[11] Feinberg, Y. and A. Skrzypacz (2002): “Uncertainty about uncertainty and delay in
bargaining,” mimeo.
[12] Fudenberg, D., D. Kreps, and D. Levine (1988): “On the Robustness of Equilibrium
Reﬁnements,” Journal of Economic Theory, 44, 354-380.
[13] Harsanyi, J. (1967): “Games with Incomplete Information played by Bayesian Players.
Part I: the Basic Model,” Management Science 14, 159-182.
[14] Kajii, A. and S. Morris (1997): “The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Informa-
tion,” Econometrica, 65, 1283-1309.
[15] Kajii, A. and S. Morris (1998): “Payoﬀ Continuity in Incomplete Information Games,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 82, 267-276.
[16] Kreps, D. and R. Wilson (1982): “Sequential Equilibria,” Econometrica, 50-4, 863-894.FINITE-ORDER IMPLICATIONS 35
[17] Mertens and Zamir (1985): “Formulation of Bayesian Analysis for Games with Incom-
plete Information,” International Journal of Game Theory, 10, 619-632.
[18] Monderer, D. and D. Samet (1989): “Approximating Common Knowledge with Common
Beliefs,” Games and Economic Behavior, 1, 170-190.
[19] Monderer, D. and D. Samet (1997): “Proximity of information in games with incomplete
information,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 21, 707-725.
[20] Morris, S. (2002): “Typical Types,” mimeo.
[21] Morris, S. and Ui (2002): “Generalized Potentials and Robust Sets of Equilibria,” mimeo.
[22] Moulin, H. (1984): “Dominance solvability and Cournot stability,” Mathematical Social
Sciences 7, 83-102.
[23] Milgrom, P. and J. Roberts (1990): “Rationalizability, Learning, and Equilibrium in
Games with Strategic Complementarities,” Econometrica, 58-6, 1255-1277.
[24] Milgrom, P. and R. Weber (1985): “Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete
Information,” Mathematics of Operations Research, 10, 619-632.
[25] Nyarko, Y. (1996): “Convergence in Economic Models with Bayesian Hierarchies of
Beliefs,” Journal of Economic Theory, 74, 266-296.
[26] Okuguchi, K. and Suzumura, K. (1971): “Uniqueness of the Cournot Oligopoly Equilib-
rium,” Economic Studies Quarterly, 22, 81-83.
[27] Pearce, D. (1984): “Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection,”
Econometrica, 52, 1029-1050.
[28] Rubinstein, A. (1989): “The Electronic Mail Game: Strategic Behavior Under ‘Almost
Common Knowledge’,” The American Economic Review, Vol. 79, No. 3, pp. 385-391.
[29] Townsend, R. (1983): “Forecasting the Forecasts of Others,” Journal of Political Econ-
omy, 9-4, 546-88.
[30] Ui, T. (2001). “Robust Equilibria of Potential Games,” Econometrica 69, 1373-1380.
[31] Wilson, R. (1987): “Game-Theoretic Analyses of Trading Processes,” in: Truman Bewley
(ed.) Advances in Economic Theory: Fifth World Congress, Cambridge UK: Cambridge
University Press, 33-70.
MIT
URL: http://econ-www.mit.edu/faculty/myildiz/index.htm